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Book Reviews
Jessica Moss. 2021. Plato’s Epistemology: Being and Seeming. Oxford; New York: Oxford
University Press. Pp. 272. Cloth. (ISBN 9780198867401) $85.00.
Epistemology nowadays usually holds that belief and knowledge apply to the same objects,
but differ in other ways (e.g., belief is fallible, knowledge is infallible). A straightforward
reading of Plato, however, holds that, for him, knowledge and belief are distinct because
they apply to two different worlds, reality (Forms) and appearances (perceptibles,
things that are becoming): hence the “Two Worlds View.” Gail Fine (Cambridge
1990), however, argued that Plato rejects Two Worlds and aligns better with modern
epistemology (i.e., that knowledge and belief have overlapping objects), and much
subsequent scholarship has followed suit. Fine’s analysis has great strengths: how, after all,
can Republic’s philosophers use knowledge of Forms to rule if they rule over perceptibles,
things that cannot be the object of knowledge.
Moss’ book, which works to be accessible to all, will find a mostly specialized
audience. It revives the Two Worlds view: epistêmê (traditionally “knowledge”) is confined
to Forms, and doxa (traditionally “belief”) is confined to appearances, because Plato’s
metaphysics presents “Two Worlds,” one of appearances (inferior: unreal, untrue,
unstable, likenesses), the other of being (superior: true, real, stable). Moss improves the
foundations and defenses of that view and shows that in “Two Worlds” dialogues like
Republic, epistêmê and doxa are not modern philosophical “knowledge” and “belief” and
do not share the same concerns.
Chapter 1 shifts the burden of proof: Republic 477 (the “powers argument”: a
central touchstone) says that doing different work or having different objects differentiates
powers, and so epistêmê and doxa are distinct because their objects are distinct: that is
Moss’ “natural, simple, straightforward” reading of that and other passages (Republic,
Timaeus, Phaedo, Phaedrus). Hence, views claiming overlapping ranges for doxa and
epistêmê should be preferred only if Moss’ distinct-objects reading fails. A survey of
interpretations from antiquity to today shows history favoring Moss, which suggests that
overlappers risk anachronism.
In chapter 2, Moss shows that Plato often individuates powers by their
objects, cognitive powers specifically by their subject matters. Compare sight and
hearing, essentially related to distinct, special, but not necessarily physically separate
objects. There, objects define the powers, not vice versa. Moss claims Aristotle (NE 1139a6
ff, i.a.) has a similar objects-based account of cognition, whose underlying principle
that like is cognized by like is shared by Plato. Many passages show that Forms and
epistêmê are stable, clear, and precise (“clean”), whereas appearances and doxa are
unstable, obscure, and imprecise (“messy”). Moreover, Republic’s Sun and Divided Line,
Philebus 58 and Timaeus 29b-c show the cleanness of Forms makes our souls clean and
the messiness of appearances makes souls messy.
Chapter 3 suggests that across all dialogues, the special object of epistêmê is the
ontologically superior (marked by capitalization: Being, Is, etc.) whereas doxa’s object is
the ontologically inferior. Superiority plays out in contrasts: 1) what Is (purity) v. what
is-and-is-not, 2) Being (stability) v. becoming, 3) Being X (essentialness) v. X things, 4)
Being (genuineness) v. being a likeness or image, 5) Being v. seeming, 6) a thing’s Being
v. its affections, 7) X-ness’ Being v. X things, 8) X-ness’ Being v. perceptible X-ness.
Rather than navigate and apply all these nuanced contrasts, Moss focuses on what they
all share: superior v. inferior. She suggests Plato had an “under-theorized” notion of
fundamentality: inferior depends on superior (cf. Aristotle’s primary substance). In sum,
Plato takes it as obvious that epistêmê is of being, inflates being into ontologically superior
Being, and specifies that Being defines epistêmê (112).
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Chapter 4 asks: does Moss’ epistêmê do what Plato requires of epistêmê?
Being infallible: Being is almost synonymous with truth in Plato. Being explanatory
and “clean”: clearly Forms are the cause of everything else and “clean,” and so
confining epistêmê to Forms is explanatory and clean. What about epistêmê applied
to perceptibles? You cannot see sounds because there is nothing visible there. Likewise
you cannot have epistêmê of perceptibles because there is no being there. But, some
object, Republic’s philosophers rule appearances. Note, however, that miscalculation
derails kallipolis. Hence, philosophers are likely not using epistêmê directly to
rule. Furthermore, appearances are images of Forms, philosophers are experts at
distinguishing such things, and their work with perceptibles takes Forms as models and
standards, and so they excel at ruling even without epistêmê of perceptibles.
Chapter 5: Moss’ epistêmê, like “understanding” and nous in Heraclitus,
Parmenides, Aristotle, and the Neoplatonists, requires reaching underlying reality,
which Plato pursues for fundamentally ethical reasons, whereas modern epistemology’s
“knowledge” is more independent of metaphysics and ethics.
Chapters 6-8 mirror chapters 3-5: 6) what doxa is of, 7) what doxa does, and
8) what doxa is, namely a cognition that is false or deficiently true, “unstable, unclear,
imprecise, transmitted by shallow persuasion, and restricted to the perceptible realm”
(196). Where generic “belief” is about anything and can become “knowledge,” in the
“Two Worlds dialogues” doxa’s scope is confined to appearances and so never becomes
epistêmê. Empirical cognition and dreaming better characterize doxa. In the Two
Worlds dialogues, Plato discusses (objective) appearances presented to us and (subjective)
appearances we form of them, but he moves without argument between the two, and
they are always contrasted with being. That, combined with the restriction of epistêmê
to Being, suggests that in those dialogues appearances define doxa. Consequently, Moss
deflates occasional talk of “true” doxai: “the line between seemings as a whole and Being
is much brighter than that between different kinds of seeming” (156-7): tellingly, when
Plato contrasts doxa and epistêmê, he never speaks of “true” doxa. Doxa is both unstable,
because appearances are, and subject to rhetoric, because appearances are rhetoric’s
subject matter. Doxa is confined to appearances because of Plato’s like-is-cognized-bylike principle mentioned above: becoming seems, but Forms cannot seem. Moss once
again focuses on superiority and inferiority: cave-dwellers have doxa, an inferior grasp of
inferior objects, and they don’t even know it. Humanity’s default position is atheoretically
acceptance via eikasia (imagination, conjecture) of what seems as being, distinguishing
of images of appearances and appearances via pistis (trust, conviction, faith), and
obliviousness to the intellectual work that appearances can summon (the “summoners
passage” in Republic 521ff.). Plato’s occasional talk of doxa of Form(s) is 1) speaking
loosely, 2) Forms “appearing” via particulars, 3) what sometimes summons intellectual
work that can break through to Forms, or 4) similar to saying that Thales’ thought about
water. People who lack epistêmê but have thoughts about Forms (e.g. most characters in
the Two Worlds dialogues) have dianoia (the third stage on the divided line, inferior to
epistêmê, but superior to doxa).
Chapters 9 and 10, briefly limns out Moss’ views on epistêmê and doxa in “early
dialogues” and Theaetetus respectively. With some problems, the views presented in the
“early dialogues” either converge with the views in the Two Worlds dialogues or constitute
a pathway leading to it. Theaetetus neglects Forms and their connections to epistêmê, but
nonetheless in it 1) epistêmê is of Being and 2) cognition inherits qualities from its objects.
By 1 and 2, “perception is epistêmê” (Theaetetus’ first definition of epistêmê) readily
leads to the Pythagorean thesis (seeming is being) and the Heraclitean thesis (being and
becoming are not different), and Socrates’ refutation of that first definition requires that
epistêmê has a special superior realm. Theaetetus’ second definition of epistêmê conceives
doxa as generic belief, of which epistêmê is a special kind, and so differs from doxa of the
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Two Worlds dialogues. The third definition (epistêmê is true doxa plus an explanatory
account) may be a new epistemology. And yet, the definition’s failure may show Plato
rejecting Form-less epistemology, and emphasizing eye-witnessing in the jury passage (Tht.
201) may metaphorically emphasize contact with reality, and so epistêmê may still have its
own exclusive object, Being.
Among this book’s limitations: nothing about recollection or participation, and
little attention paid to Parmenides. Overall, however, anyone interested in these issues must
read Moss’ excellent book, because it reacts to recent challenges to and provides shored-up
better foundations for the historically prevalent interpretation.
Jacques Bailly
University of Vermont
jacques.bailly@uvm.edu
Cyril Courrier and Julio Cesar Magalhães de Oliveira, eds. 2022. Ancient History from
Below: Subaltern Experiences and Actions in Context. London: Routledge. Pp. 320
14B/W Illustrations. Cloth. (ISBN 9780367424411) £120.00.
This trail-blazing volume appeared in September 2021 in the series Routledge
Monographs in Classical Studies. Its title is enough to understand the mission of the
editors, Julio Cesar Magalhães de Oliveira and Cyril Courrier, who mean to pose two
crucial questions: is it possible to study the ancient world from below? If so, how? Because
of the clarity with which these issues are addressed and the vigor that characterizes each
contributor’s theoretical approach, the volume offers an innovative bottom-up perspective
on the Ancient World. While the answer to the first question—namely the “common
conviction that another ancient history is possible” (1)—is announced by the editors in the
introduction of the volume (1–31) and presented as both its political and epistemological
principle (2), the ten chapters of Ancient History from Below analyze a wide variety of
case studies, illustrating how to achieve such a change of perspective, which affects not
only the common understanding of the past but also the most widespread methodologies
used to manage ancient sources.
The publication of this volume cannot be considered a mere intellectual
achievement, since it openly displays a political commitment. As Brent Shaw pinpoints in his
foreword “What is this history to be?” (x–xxv), both the conditions of “history” and “prehistory”—far from being simplistic criteria of periodization—are determined by power and
wealth (xv). Beyond being characterized by oppression and lack of hegemony, the condition
of subaltern groups materializes as an absence of sources and the impossibility of leaving a
trace in the world: a “crisis of the presence”, we could say, borrowing an anthropological
category coined by De Martino (1977, 177–78); or a result of the “epistemic violence”
conceptualized by Spivak (1985, 247–52) in her attempt to show how, throughout the
history, archives have been a privileged place of crystallization of the power relations. History
is not only the final judgment of the hegemonic group on the subaltern but also the narrative
representation of their hegemony, as the editors underpin (4). Therefore, the methodological
difficulty encountered by the contributors appears to be a sociological and anthropological
problem, as well as an academic one (xiv).
The volume is built on a solid theoretical structure, the foundations of which
lie in conception of historiography by Benjamin 1980, meant as the task to rescue the
oppressed from the narrative shackles of the elites. Hence, to recover the memory of
the subaltern groups, we must “brush history against the grain”. On the same page, if
the definition of “subaltern groups” adopted in the volume is inspired by both Gramsci
1977 and the works of Guha 1983 and the Subaltern Studies Group, the notion of
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